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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 860, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE YONKERS CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 




YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 860, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
#2A~2/21/75 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1308 
CASE NO. U-1311 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of the Yonkers Federation of 
Teachers, Local 860, AFT, AFL-CIO (YFT) to a decision of a hearing officer 
dismissing its charge (Case No. U-1311) against the Board of Education of the 
Yonkers City School District (School District) and finding merit in the charge 
(Case No. U-1308) of the School District against it. The cross-charges grow 
out of an agreement that, according to both parties, was reached on September 4 
1974. The School District charged YFT with failure to negotiate in good faith 
in violation of CSL §209-a.2(b) in that it reneged upon a clause of that 
agreement dealing with the observation and evaluation of teachers by refusing 
to sign the agreement unless inconsistent provisions of a predecessor agreement 
were retained. YFT charged the School District with failure to negotiate in 
good faith in violation of CSL §209-a.l(d) in that it refused to implement any 
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of the new working conditions specified in the agreement. At issue is Item 15 
of the Memorandum of Agreement of September 4, 1974, which reads as follows: 
"Page 36, Article XXI, Section X, Miscellaneous - Tenured Teachers 
Each administrator has the right to observe tenured teachers. 
Such administrator has the right to confer with the teacher 
regarding such observation and may make positive and/or negative 
comments. The administrator may make notes regarding the evalu-
ation.The administrator may use these notes to assist in the 
preparation of an annual rating. Once the annual rating has been 
issued, the administrator shall destroy all notes regarding obser-
vation conferences. There shall be no limitation to the extent 
that such notes may be incorporated into the annual evaluation. 
During the course of the year, the teacher shall at the teacher's 
request have access to such notes and the right to comment on 
them." (emphasis added) 
The" language of the predecessor agreement, the retention of xtfhich 
was insisted upon by YFT, is as follows: 
Article XXI, Section X, Subsection 2 (Annual Evaluation) 
"Tenured teachers shall receive an annual written rating of 
'satisfactory' or 'unsatisfactory.' If the rating is 
'satisfactory' only positive comments supporting such a 
rating shall be rendered in writing. If the rating is 
'unsatisfactory,' a written evaluation containing both 
positive and negative comments, where appropriate, shall 
be provided." (emphasis added) 
In substance, YFT's exceptions allege the following: 
1. As there had been no specific demand on September 4 that the language of 
the predecessor agreement be deleted, it could not have "reneged" on the agree-
ment by insisting that the language be retained. 
2. By reserving to the Yonkers Board of Education the right to ratify an 
agreement signed by its superintendent of schools, the School District violated 
the Taylor Law. 
3. There having been an agreement, the School District could not refuse to 
implement undisputed aspects of that agreement because one clause of the agree-
ment was in dispute. It was obligated to implement the balance of the agreement 
and to submit the disputed clause for interpretation pursuant to the grievance 
procedure contained in the agreement. 
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4. The hearing officer's resolution of credibility issues against a witness of 
the YFT was arbitrary and reflected a bias against the YFT. 
5. The hearing officer admitted incompetent evidence prejudicial to YFT, 
further demonstrating his bias. 
6. The order of the hearing officer directing YFT to negotiate in good faith 
by executing an agreement embodying an observation and evaluation clause con-
sistent with his determination of the agreement exceeds the jurisdiction of 
both the hearing officer and of this Board. 
Three alternative conclusions are available to us regarding the 
Memorandum of Agreement of September 4, 1974. We might conclude, as did the 
hearing officer, that the School District's understanding is correct, to wit, 
the parties agreed to a new observation and evaluation procedure which neces-
sarily displaced preexisting inconsistent procedures. We might conclude that 
YFT's understanding is correct, to wit, the parties agreed to new contract 
language concerning observation and evaluation procedures, but that such 
language must be read in concert with any preexisting.language not explicitly 
deleted by agreement, and that any apparent inconsistencies must be harmonized 
in accordance with the contractual grievance procedure. Finally, we might 
conclude that, ;although the parties agreed upon language on September 4, 1974, 
there was no true meeting of the minds and, therefore, no agreement. Having 
reviewed the record and read and heard the presentations of the parties, we 
confirm the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing officer. 
Resolution of the question of what, if anything, was agreed upon on September 4 
1974 about the observation and evaluation of teachers pivots on conflicting 
testimony of witnesses of the parties. In this connection the hearing officer 
did not credit the testimony of YFT's primary witness on various crucial 
points "based on his demeanor as a x^ itness and his sometimesrvague and contra-
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dictory responses to other questions." The hearing officer further stated 
that the demeanor of the School District's primary witnesses as well as their 
clearer and fuller recall of crucial events persuaded him to credit their 
version of such crucial events. Sased upon his reading of the credible 
1 
testimony, he found that the parties agreed to observation and evaluation 
procedures on September- 4, 1974 which permitted the School District-to include 
in its annual evaluation of tenured teachers both positive and negative comments 
noted during such observations and evaluations. Implicit in this agreement, 
he found that preexisting contract language limiting the School District to 
the inclusion of "only positive comments" supporting a satisfactory annual 
evaluation to have been supplanted. By refusing to delete such inconsistent 
language of the predecessor agreement, the hearing officer found, and we agree, 
that YFT reneged on its agreement. 
We confirm the hearing officer's determinations with respect to the other 
subsidiary exceptions. There is no indication of bias reflected in his conduct 
of the hearing nor any prejudicial error in his rulings on the admission of 
evidence. He was correct in reaching the merits of the case, rather than 
deferring to arbitration." it was appropriate for him to resolve the improper 
practice question in this case; in order to do so, it was necessary for him to 
determine whether or not there was an agreement and, if so, to define .that 
agreement. As the parties negotiated on a "package" basis making each item 
individually agreed to contingent upon total agreement, the employer did not 
1 "The determination of the hearing officer rested on a weighing of the credi-
bility of the testimony adduced. In such a case, the findings of the 
hearing officer as trier of the fact should be given the greatest weight." 
Fashion Institute of Technology v. Helsby, 44 AD 2d 550 (1974). 
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commit an improper practice when it refused to implement new conditions con- -
tained in the agreement prior to resolution of the dispute over observation and 
evaluation of teachers. The hearing officer properly noted that, although a 
public employer may not unilaterally reserve to itself the right to ratify an 
agreement reached by its chief executive officer, its right to ratify may be, 
and was, established as a negotiating ground rule with the consent of the 
other party, (see Matter of Harrison Association of Teachers, 7" PERB"45O~5 ~ 
[1974]; Matter of Glen Cove City School District, 6 PERB 3017 [1973]. Finally, 
we reassert the proposition —applied by the hearing officer— that a party, 
having reached agreement on contract terms, may not refuse to sign a written 
embodiment of that agreement, and that PERB may order that party to do so 
(Matter of Somers Faculty Association, 3 PERB 3583 [1970]). Thus we are not, 
as suggested by the dissent, dictating the terms of agreement. Rather we are 
directing the incorporation into the written agreement of a term agreed 
upon by the parties in the course of negotiations. 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
1. WE DISMISS the charge filed by YFT, Case No. U-1311, and 
2. WE ORDER YFT to negotiate in good faith by ceasing and 
desisting from reneging on its agreement 
regarding the observation and evaluation of 
teachers and insisting upon an observation and 
evaluation clause contrary to that agreed upon 
in negotiations. 
WE FURTHER ORDER YFT to negotiate in good faith by executing 
a final contract for 1974-1977 embodying an 
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Dated: New York, New York 
February 21, 1975 
observation and evaluation clause consistent 
with the parties' agreement in negotia-
tions as described herein. 
RSBgf.t DT Helsby, Clfairman 
tgi 1 
-7 
Opinion of Fred L. Denson, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 
I do not agree with the majority that YFT committed an improper 
practice, as charged in Case No. U-130,8. I do concur in the result of the 
majority to the extent that it dismissed the charge of YFT in Case No. U-1311. 
Implicit in -the collective negotiations process under- the-Act-is ~ . 
the right of the parties to freely negotiate and contract with one another 
concerning the terms and conditions of employment without third-party inter-
ference by this Board or any other governmental agency. Where parties have 
negotiated diligently and agreed upon language to be inserted into a contract, 
i 
but have not agreed upon or taken the opportunity to negotiate the placement of 
such language into a contract (where such placement is crucial with regard to 
the meaning to be given such language), the matter is subject to further nego-
tiations and the parties should be given the opportunity to negotiate the 
placement issue. For the majority to fashion an order which, in essence, 
dictates the terms of employment for a matter the parties have not been given 
the opportunity to negotiate and which, by acknowledgment of the parties, have 
not been earnestly negotiated, is not consistent with established notions of 
freedom of contract. 
I am of the opinion that the relief sought by both parties should 
be denied since a binding ''contractual agreement" (in a legal sense) was never 
reached by the parties regarding tenured teacher observations and evaluation 
procedures. The parties should be directed to return to the negotiating table 
to resolve the matter through either the negotiation or arbitration process. 
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Before a decision can be made as to whether or not either party 
committed an improper practice by refusing to execute and implement the 
terms of an "agreement", a determination must first be made as to whether or not 
a "contractual agreement" had been reached. Neither the majority nor the 
hearing officer have adequately treated this dimension of the matter before us. 
Under Section 201.12 of the Act-, the -term "agreement-11 -means- "the -
result of the exchange of mutual promises.. .which becomes a binding contract." 
Included among the several legal prerequisites for a binding contract is 
mutuality of assent, which includes "a meeting of the minds." Simpson, one of 
1 
several basic authorities on contract law who deal rather extensively with 
mutuality of assent states: 
"The first requisite of a contract is that 
the parties manifest to each other their mutual 
assent to the same bargain at the same time.. 
It has been declared in hundreds of decisions 
that before a contract can result the "minds of 
the parties must meet," meaning that they must 
teach an agreement on the same bargain on the 
same terms and at the same time.... 
It is essential that the parties shall have 
reached an agreement as to the nature and extent 
of the obligations assumed. If the terms of the 
bargain are not fully settled, or if the expressed 
assent of the parties is at variance as to the 
terms, no contract is created." (emphasis added) 
Standing alone, the agreed-upon language is ambiguous and the 
interpretation urged by each of the parties in their briefs and at oral argument 
is equally plausible, thus the meaning and effect of this language is dependent 
upon its placement in the contract. Since there was no agreement as to the 
placement of the language in the contract or what should be deleted or replaced 
_1 Law of Contracts, L.P. Simpson, West Publishing Co. (1965), p.9. 
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in the old contract, as noted by the hearing officer, there could be no 
mutuality of assent and thus no "agreement" within the meaning of the Act. 
The majority has ascertained only that the parties have agreed upon the language 
to be incorporated somewhere into the final contract. The majority further 
recognizes, and the hearing officer notes, that the parties never agreed to, 
hor even extensively" discussed, the precise point of placement of the language 
in the contract (which would control the meaning of the language as previously 
explained). Admittedly, under certain circumstances it is argumentative whether 
the meaning controls placement or whether placement controls meaning. Nonethe-
less where, as here, the parties have not agreed upon, negotiated, nor discussed 
any one of these factors, then they must be given the opportunity to do so. 
While PERB, through its conciliation arm, may lend assistance to the 
parties to help them reach agreement, it is not the function of this Board under 
these circumstances to dictate the terms of an agreement as the majority, in 
essence, has done. Such action, in my opinion, is an abridgement'. of the 
parties' freedom of contract, as discussed by Justice Black in H. K. Porter v. 
NLRB, 397 US 99, 107: 
"...[i]t is implicit in the entire structure 
of the Act that the Board acts to oversee and 
referee the process of collective bargaining, 
leaving the results of the contest to the bar-
gaining strength of the parties....The Board's 
remedial powers under§10 of the Act are broad, N., 
but they are limited to carrying out the policies 
of the Act itself. One of these fundamental 
policies is freedom of contract. While the 
parties' freedom of contract is not absolute under 
the Act, allowing the Board to compel agreement 
when the parties themselves are unable to do so 
would violate the fundamental premise on which 
the Act is based - private bargaining under govern-
mental supervision of the procedure alone, without 
any official compulsion over the actual terms of 
the contract... . " 
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In an attempt to avoid confrontation with the parties' freedom of 
contract, the majority has improperly cast the issue in a different mold. It 
has adopted a series of credibility findings by the hearing officer on certain 
crucial matters to determine the meaning of the language in question and, 
thereafter, to order that a contractual agreement be executed having the 
language in question placed therein in 'accordance with the majority's "inter-
pretation of its meaning. As noted by the majority, the hearing officer's 
2 
credibility findings are to be given great weight and are not to be disturbed 
by a reviewing body unless clearly erroneous. Albeit, credibility findings are 
not sacrosanct and cannot be used as a vehicle to establish a fact which never 
existed. Thus, credibility findings cannot be used to determine the agreement 
of the parties as to placement of the clause in issue where such an agreement 
never, in fact, existed. 
While Assistant Superintendent of Schools for Instruction, Stanley 
A. Shainker, a key witness for the District, assumed that the agreed-upon 
language would replace certain specified language in the old contract, he 
acknowledged that this assumption was never communicated to YFT (transcript 
p. 335). Such an uncommunicated assumption cannot be construed as a manifesta-
tion of intent which would create a mutuality of assent required for a con-
tractual agreement. 
It is recognized that in many situations, in order to facilitate 
settlement during contract negotiations, the parties will agree to placement of 
ambiguous provisions into a contractual agreement and, should a problem arise 
regarding these provisions during the life of the contract, to T&£er the matter 
to an arbitrator. Such is not the case here since the parties simply have not 
2 Fashion Institute of. Technology, 7 PEKB 7009 (1974). 
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reached a "contractual agreement." While language has been agreed to, the 
meaning and effect of this language is dependent upon its placement in the 
contract; since there has been no agreement as to the placement, there is no 
enforceable "contractual agreement" within the meaning of Section 201.12 of 
the Act. 
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the District had knowledge 
of the lack of mutuality of assent between the parties on the placement issue 
after verbal agreement had been reached on language, but prior to the time the 
memorandum of understanding incorporating the agreed-upon language was reduced 
to writing and signing, but failed to communicate such knowledge to the YFT. 
Immediately after the meeting on September 4, 1974 during which verbal agreement 
was reached on the language, Counsel to the District and a representative from 
YFT met to draw up a memorandum of understanding for the parties to sign, 
incorporating the various items agreed to during the contract negotiations which 
had transpired over the previous several months. While drafting the memorandum, 
Counsel to the District became aware of the lack of mutuality of assent between 
the parties on the issue of placement into the contract of the language in 
question (transcript, pages 406, 537). The record does not indicate that the 
representative of the YFT had similar knowledge, but does establish that Counsel 
to the District knew that the legal consequences of the lack of mutuality of 
assent and a "meeting of the minds" was that there could be no legal and binding 
contract (transcript, p. 409). This knowledge of Counsel must be imputed to the 
District, thereby giving the District such knowledge before the memorandum of 
understanding was signed and after verbal agreement on the language was reached. 
In my opinion, the District had an obligation to inform the YFT of the lack of 
mutuality of assent and the nonfulfillment of this duty should bar the employer 
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from acquiring the sought-after relief. 
The conclusions herein are not in opposition to the credibility find-
ings of the hearing officer, but rather are based upon uncontradicted testimony 
contained in the record and upon the .^sequence of events ' as outlined in 
the hearing officer's decision. The decision of the hearing officer should be 
"reversed and the",i^ 1:^ ri''"sfioTil'd""be^ '"re"fe"r"re"d''"b'ac'k"'t"0'"th."e"p"art±-es" "to allow them-
to negotiate their differences. 
Having found that the parties did not reach a "contractual agreement^' 
it follows that the School District did not violate CSL Section 209-a.2(b) by 
failing to implement such an agreement. This is clear because, as noted by the 
hearing officer and by the majority, the parties had agreed to negotiate on a 
"package" basis, making each item individually agreed to contingent upon total 
agreement. I, therefore, concur with my associates in dismissing the charge 
filed by YFT in Case No. U-1311. 
j (N2^^/^J 
Fred L. Denson, Member of the Board 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e Mat ter of #23-2/21/75 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
ROCKLAND COUNTY, BOARD DECISION 
Respondent, CASE NO. U-1289 
- and -
BOCES STAFF COUNCIL, 
'"" b a r g i n g "Party. 
This matter comes to us upon exceptions of Rockland County BOCES 
(respondent) from a decision of a hearing officer who found that it violated 
CSL §209-a.l(d) in that it refused to pay annual increments during negotiations 
for a successor contract to one that had expired. The hearing officer found 
that respondent had failed to negotiate in good faith and he recommended an 
order requiring respondent to do so; the order contemplated a requirement that 
respondent pay increments retroactive to the commencement of the 1974-75 school 
year with interest thereon at the rate of 3 per cent per annum from September 13, 
1974 to the date of payment. The charge had been filed by BOCES Staff Council 
(charging party) which is the recognized negotiating representative of 
instructional employees of respondent. 
The material facts are not in question. Since 1968, the parties have 
been signatories to a series of four agreements, the most recent of which 
covered a period from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1974. Each of these agreements 
had provided for a progression of automatic step increments for employees in 
the unit. In prior years, after previous contracts between the parties had 
expired and before successor agreements had been reached, the employer had paid 
the automatic step increments to unit employees. 
Negotiations for a successor agreement to the one expiring on June 30, 
1974 did not commence until August 1974 and as of the date of the closing of 
the record, no successor agreement had been achieved. In anticipation of the 
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conmencement of negotiations, the employer adopted a resolution on June 19, 
1974 which provided 
"RESOLVED that pending the completion and execution of new 
agreements between the respective parties or September 1, 
1974, whichever is sooner, the provisions of the agreements 
expiring June 30, 1974 will be recognized, including salary 
and salary rates in effect on June 30, 1974, for the 
period herein contemplated." 
This resolution was subsequently extended. Pursuant to it, the respondent 
-maintained salaries- at the -rate -in-effect on June -30-,- 1974-but refused-to-pay -
step increments to returning unit employees. 
Relying upon our Triborough doctrine (Matter of Triborough Bridge and 
Tunnel Authority , 5 PERB 3064 [1972]) the hearing officer determined that 
respondent violated its duty to negotiate in good faith in that it unilaterally 
altered terms and conditions of employment during negotiations. This duty, as 
articulated in the Triborough case, is directly applicable to the circumstances 
in the instant case. It consists of two propositions, 1) it is a violation of a 
public employer's duty to negotiate in good faith for it to alter, unilaterally 
during negotiations, terms and conditions of employment, and 2) a long standing 
and continual practice of providing annual salary increments is such a term and 
condition of employment that cannot be altered unilaterally during negotiations. 
In its exceptions, respondent argues that the second proposition is 
invalid; thus, notwithstanding its failure to pay increments, it did not violate 
any duty to maintain the status quo. It further argues that this Board and its 
hearing officers are without authority to direct it to pay to employees 
increments as a remedy for a violation of CSL §209-a.l(d), or interest thereon. 
We endorse the reasoning of the hearing officer and his conclusions of 
law. Supplementing his analysis, we reassert the validity of the Triborough 
doctrine. Civil Service Law §209-a.l(d) declares it to be an improper practice 
for a public employer "to refuse to negotiaf .'••: li;.,;-pod faith with the duly 
recognized or certified representative of its ^ iijlic employees." The sine qua 
n o n o f
 negotiating in good faith is refraining from imposing unilateral 
873o 
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changes in terms and conditions of employment during negotiations. This 
proposition is the essence of our Triborough doctrine. In the Triborough case, 
we held that the expectation of an annual increment based upon a long standing 
and continual practice of its having been paid is a term and condition of 
employment that cannot be altered unilaterally during negotiations. For this 
purpose, it makes no difference whether or not such practice was ever embodied 
1] 
in an agreement." " '"" " ""~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
The respondent's second exception is supported by both a constitutional 
and statutory argument. The constitutional argument is that the payment of 
salary increments to employees when there is no contractual duty to do so would 
violate Article VIII, Subdivision 1 of the State Constitution which prohibits 
"gifts" of public monies to employees. In our opinion, the continued service 
performed by the employees on behalf of respondent constitutes consideration 
for the increments. Thus, we find that the issue of constitutional gifts does 
not arise (see Bd. of Educ. Huntington v. Teachers, 30 NY 2d 122, 130 (1972)). 
The statutory argument derives from the language of CSL §205.5(d) which 
provides that in case of a violation of CSL §209-a.l(d) our procedures "shall 
provide only for the entry of an order directing the public employer — to 
negotiate in good faith." This language dates from 1969. We believe that it 
was intended as a legislative rejection of a decision of the Federal Court of 
Appeals in United Steel Workers v. NLRB ,389 F 2d 295 (1967), in which for the 
first time the remedial powers of the NLRB to correct the unfair labor practices 
of bargaining in bad faith were considered broad enough to compel acceptance of 
a determination or condition of employment not agreed upon. Subsequent to the 
enactment of CSL §205.5(d), the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
1] In this connection, we find persuasive a private sector decision, this 
being the decision of the National Labor Relations Board in Peterson 
Builders, Inc., 215 NLRB No. 12, 1974-75 CCH NLRB «[15, 248. In that case, 
the majority of the NLRB said "an employer with a past history of a merit 
increase program may no longer continue to unilaterally exercise its 
discretion with respect to such increases, but it also may not discontinue 
them." Q 
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Federal Court of Appeals and held that the NLKB could not compel an employer to 
enter into an agreement it had not reached, H. K. Porter Company v. NLRB, 
397 U.S. 99 (1970). We do not question that such a limitation upon our remedial 
powers was intended and is appropriate, but respondent's posture, which would 
limit our power to the entry of an order containing the specific language of the 
statute, would render procedures under CSL §209-a.l(d) meaningless. We do not 
believeJ^at i^e^Le^^^ procedures should be futile. 
Authority to impose upon respondent a duty to pay interest of 3 per cent 
per annum in addition to the increments not paid derives from General Municipal 
Law §3-a. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the hearing officer and we 
order respondent to negotiate in good faith, such order contemplating that 
respondent will cease and desist from refusing to pay increments to those of 
its employees entitled to increments under the recently expired agreement and 
that it will forthwith pay to such employees increments retroactive to the 
commencement of the 1974-75 school year with interest thereon at the rate of 
3 per cent per annum from September 13, 1974 to the date of payment. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
.CASE_.N_Q...„U-12.9_4_ 
This matter comes to us upon exceptions of Livingston, Steuben, 
Wyoming BOCES (respondent) from a decision of a hearing officer who found that 
it violated CSL §209-a.l(d) in that it refused to pay annual increments during 
negotiations for a successor agreement to one that had expired. The hearing 
officer found that respondent had failed to negotiate in good faith and he 
recommended an order requiring respondent to cease and desist from such 
violation; the order contemplated a requirement that respondent pay increments 
retroactive to the commencement of the 1974-1975 school year with interest 
thereon at the rate of 3 percent per annum. The charge had been filed by the 
Livingston, Steuben,-. Wyoming BOCES Teachers Association (charging party) which 
is the recognized negotiating representative for a unit consisting of all 
professional teaching personnel employed by the respondent. 
The material facts are not in question. A preexisting collective 
agreement expired on June 30, 1974, by which date negotiations for a successor 
agreement had not borne fruit. On September 4, 1974, with negotiations for a 
successor agreement still continuing, respondent's superintendent of schools 
informed the charging party that, during the "contractual hiatus" the teachers 
would be compensated at the same rate as during the 1973-1974 school year — 
this notwithstanding the fact that it had been a long-standing and continual 
o/oo 
In the Matter of 
LIVINGSTON, STEUBEN, WYOMING BOCES, 
Respondent, 
-and-
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practice in the district that unit members had received annual salary incre-
ments. From that day until October 21, 1974, the date of the hearing, the 
increments were not paid. 
Relying upon our Triborough doctrine (Matter of Triborough Bridge 
and Tunnel Authority, 5 PERB 3064 [1972]), the hearing officer determined that 
XI). it __is.„„a-violation of. a public- employer's -duty to -negotiate- in good-faith ^  
for it to alter unilaterally, during negotiations, terms and conditions of 
employment, and (2) a long-standing and continual practice of providing annual 
salary increments is such a term and condition of employment that cannot be 
altered unilaterally during negotiations. Respondent's exceptions argue that 
the Triborough doctrine is invalid; that private sector precedents are inap-
plicable; that assuming arguendo there is a duty to maintain the status quo, 
the expectation of increments is not a part of that status quo, and that 
assuming arguendo that it did violate its duty to maintain the status quo by 
failing to pay increments, the charging party is nevertheless estopped from 
relying on that violation because it, too^ violated that status quo. 
Many of these arguments were dealt with by the hearing officer and 
we endorse his reasoning and his conclusions of law. Supplementing his analysis, 
we reassert the validity of the Triborough doctrine. Civil Service Law §209-a.l(d|) 
declares it to be an improper practice for a public employer "to refuse to 
negotiate in good faith with the duly recognized or certified representative of 
its public employees." The sine qua non of negotiating in good faith is refrain-
ing from imposing unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment during 
1 
hegotiations. This proposition is the essence of our Triborough Doctrine. 
jL The hearing officer has not only cited several decisions of this Board in 
point, he has also cited decisions in the private sector, the reasoning of 
which supports this doctrine. Although not bound by private sector precedents 
(CSL §209-a.3), we nevertheless look to their reasoning for assistance and we 
agree with the hearing officer that the cases cited by him are persuasive. 
/O 
Board - U-1294 -3 
Secondarily, in the Triborough case we held that the expectation of an annual 
increment based upon a long-standing and continual practice of its having been 
paid is a term and condition of employment that cannot be altered unilaterally 
during negotiations- For this purpose it makes no difference whether or not 
2 
such practice was ever embodied in an agreement. 
Finally, we note that respondent alleges that on October 9, 1974 
and again on October 25, 1974 the charging party engaged in conduct violative 
of its duty to maintain the status quo during negotiations. These allegations 
are based upon material submitted to us along with respondent's brief, but are 
not included in the record before us. Accordingly, we do not consider it. 
Respondent's underlying point is, nevertheless, well taken. The duty to 
maintain the status quo devolves not only upon the public employer, but also 
upon the employee organization. Moreover, there may be circumstances where the 
failure of one party to maintain the status quo is a defense against unilateral 
alteration of the status quo by the other party. In the Triborough case, we 
said that an employee organization's right to have the status quo maintained 
depends upon its not having violated that status quo by engaging in a strike. 
In the instant case, however, no such issue is before us. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the hearing officer and 
1_ In this connection, too, we find persuasive a private sector decision, this 
being the decision of the National Labor Relations Board in Peterson 
Builders, Inc., 215 NLRB No. 12 (1974-75), CCH NLRB 1fl5,248. In that case 
the majority of the NLRB said, "an employer with a past history of a merit 
increase program may no longer continue to unilaterally exercise its 
discretion with respect to such increases, but it also may not discontinue 
them." 
Board - U-1294 -4 
WE ORDER respondent to n e g o t i a t e in good f a i t h , such order 
contemplat ing t h a t respondent w i l l cease and d e s i s t from 
re fus ing to pay increments t o t hose of i t s employees 
e n t i t l e d t o increments under t h e r e c e n t l y expi red ag ree -
ment, and t h a t i t w i l l fo r thwi th pay to such employees 
increments re1Tr6^acTriW~ to ffi 
1974-1975 schoo l y e a r , with i n t e r e s t thereon a t t h e r a t e 
of 3 pe rcen t per annum. 
Dated: New York, New York 
February 2 1 , 1975 
Robert D. Eelsby, Chairman 
Fred L. Denson 
STATE OF NEW YORK ' 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
FARMINGDALE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- a n d -
FARMINGDALE FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1889, 
NEW YORK UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,AFT,NEA. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
NASSAU CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE Vr?-,:ftEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC. , 
I n t e r v e n o r • 
#2D-2/21/75 
C a s e N o . , C-1107 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Nassau Chapter, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc.,. 
has been designated arid selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the,settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
I n c l u d e d : A l l c l e r i c a l , o p e r a t i o n a l , and ma in t enance employees . 
Excluded: A l l o t h e r employees . 
F u r t h e r , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , 
s h a l l - n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h Nassau C h a p t e r , C i v i l S e r v i c e 
|Employees A s s o c i a t i o n , I n c . , 
a n d e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d o n t h e 2 1 s t d a y o f February , • 19 75 . 
PERB 5 8 ( 2 
"ROBERT D. HELSBY, Gfiairman 
• 6 8 ) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
HAMPTON BAYS UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer , 
- a n d -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
SUFFOLK EDUCATION CHAPTER, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
HAMPTON BAYS SCHOOL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOC, 
Intervenor. 
#2E-2/21/75 
Case No. c-1165 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and.it appearing that a. 
negotiating representative has' been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
Inc. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Civil Service Employees Association, 
Suffolk Education Chapter, 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective . 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All non-teaching personnel, including custodial workers, 
. . cafeteria personnel, aides, clerk-typist, stenographers, 
account-clerks,.bus drivers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
PERB 58( 
Further,. IT"~IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Suffolk Education Chapter, 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 21st day of February 1975 
2-68) /FRED L. DE&SON 
PERB 58( 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
HERKIMER COUNTY BOCES, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
I N C . , 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
#2F-2/21/75 
Case No. c-ll.fifi 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance, with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the. settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All non-instructional employees. 
Excluded: Secretary to the District Superintendent 
and all other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above, named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. 
and enter into a written' agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to.terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 21st day of February 
Dated: New York, New York 
197/5 
F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1975 
2-68) 
/iCj0SEp4 R. yCR^LEY 
TRED L. DENSON 
PERB 58(2-68) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION 
IN THE MATTER OF 




WHITEHALL NON-INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES 
ORGANIZATION, 
. • • • I n t e r v e n o r . 
BOARD 
#2G-2/21/75 
Case N o . n -1171 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating.representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that C.S.E.A., Inc. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: Regular full-time and regular part-time 
secretarial, clerical, maintenance, service 
and transportation employees, teacher aides 
and all other regular full-time and regular 
part-time .employees of the District. 
Excluded: All certificated and confidential employees of 
the District. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with C.S.E.A., Inc. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 21st day of February' , 19 75 . 
Dated: New York, New York 
February 21, 1975 
ROBERT D. ,HEI,SB^ Chairman 
FRED L. DENSON 
g^/fcr i 
STATE OF NEW YORK "' 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION.- BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
LOCKPORT MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 
Employer, 
-and-
NIAGARA COUNTY CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, I N C . , 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
#2H-2/21/75 
Case No. c - l l R ? 
-CERTIFJCATIOKL OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
•Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected? 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Niagara County Chapter, Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All licensed practical nurses and 
r
 respiratory therapists. 
Excluded: All other job titles.' 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Niagara County Chapter, Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 21st day of February 19 75 
PERB 5£ (2 -68) 
ROBERT. D. HELS BY C h a i r m a n 
/FRED L.^DENSON 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
MONROE-WOODBURY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer , 
- a n d -
SCHOOL AND LIBRARY EMPLOYEES' UNION, LOCAL 




MONROE-W00DBURY SCHOOL UNIT, ORANGE COUNTY 
CHAPTER, CSEA, INC., 
Intervener• 
#21-2/21/75 
Case No. c-1184 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in. the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment'Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in, the Board by the 
Public Employees' .Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Monroe-Woodbury School Unit, Orange 
County Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All custodial, maintenance and transportation personnel. 
; . 
Excluded: D i r e c t o r of F a c i l i t i e s and P u p i l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , T r a n s -
p o r t a t i o n D i s p a t c h e r , Head Maintenance Man and Head mechanic 
PERB 5 8 ( 
F u r t h e r , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h Monroe-Woodbury School U n i t , Orange 
County Chap te r , C i v i l S e r v i c e Employees A s s o c i a t i o n , I n c . , 
a n d e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i s a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d o n t h e 2 1 s t d a y o f F e b r u a r y 19 75 
"ROBERT; D. HELSBY .-^Bhairman 
2 - 6 8 ) 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
HICKSVILLE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- a n d -




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
#2J-2/21/75 
Case No. C-1203 
• C E R a r I ^ C J C T T D N - n O F - I ^ p I ^ S E N T S T I V E - ^ N D ^ 0 ^ E R - T O - . M . E G O T - I - & T E - ^ - -
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure' of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating,representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
Inc., 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Givil Service Employees Association, 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective' 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All fu l l - t ime c leaners , custodians, audio-visual technic ian , 
maintenance and grounds employees. 
Excluded: Superintendent of bui ldings and grounds, Asst. Superintendent 
of "buildings and grounds, ana a l l other employees. 
F u r t h e r , IT IS ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e n a m e d ' p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h . Civi l Service Employees Association, 
I n c . , 
and e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h such employee o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s • a n d c o n d i t i o n s of employment , and s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , and . a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d on t h e 2 1 s t day of February 1975 
PERB 58 ( 2 - 6 8 ) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- a n d -
CLARKSTOWN SCHOOL UNIT, ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC. , 
#2K-2/21/75 
Case No. c-1174 
Petitioner. 
_ "CERTTFTCATrON""OF"REPRESENTATIVE"AND~T)RDER TO NE'GQTIATB ~ 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, . 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Clarkstown School Unit, Rockland 
County Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
U n i t : 
PERB 5 8 ( 2 - 6 8 ) 
Included: Pr inc ipa l food service supervisor, senior food service 
supervisor, food service' supervisor I I , head cook-, cook, 
senior food service helper , food service supervisor I , 
head cashier , food service helper , cashier . 
Excluded.: All other employees. . • • 
F u r t h e r , IT IS ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e named p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h Clarkstown School Unit, Rockland 
County Chapter, Civi l Service Employees Association, I n c . , 
and e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h such emp loyee o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s of employmen t , and s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h such employee o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of., g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d on t h e 21st day of February 19 75 . 
SEPX/R. OROWIJSY . / 
/ 'FRED L^DEN^N 
3749 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION' ^OARD 
IN THE MATTER OF #21.^2/21/75 
BATAVIA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employe r , CASE NO. C-1168 
- a n d -
S . E . I . U . , LOCAL,227/ AFL-CIO, 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 2 9 , 1974 , S . E . I . U . , L o c a l 2 2 7 , AFL-CIO ( p e t i t i o n e r ) 
f i l e d , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e R u l e s of P r o c e d u r e o f t h e New Y o r k 
S t a t e P u b l i c Employment R e l a t i o n s B o a r d , a t i m e l y p e t i t i o n f o r 
i 
d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n .of t he Batavia C i ty School D i s t r i c t Cus tod ia l 
1] • -
Association and for certification as the exclusive negotiating , 
representative of custodians and cleaners employed by the Batavia 
City School District. Thereafter, the parties entered into a 
consent agreement in which they stipulated to the following as 
the appropriate negotiating unit: 
Included:. Custodians, cleaners and head custodians. 
Excluded.:. Sup.v of buildings and grounds and all other 
employees. 
The .consent agreement was approved by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation on January 13, 1975. 
Pursuant to the consent agreement, a secret ballot election 
was held on January 31, 1.975. The results of this election. 
indicate that a majority of the eligible voters in the stipulated 
unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for purposes 
2] 
of collective negotiations by the petitioner.. 
; . \ 
!•] The Association advised that it was no.t interested in 
participating in this proceeding. 
2] Of, the 29 employees participating in the election, 14 
voted in favor of and 15 voted against representation 
by the petitioner. 
3750 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated: New York, New York 
February 21, 1975 
